The next day, President Kennedy was notified of the findings. “Mr. President, there is now hard photographic evidence that the Russians have offensive missiles in Cuba,” he was told by McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Advisor. President Kennedy knew these were a serious threat, and the missiles threatened cities such as New York, Philadelphia and Washington, D.C. (Larson.) Kennedy then picked a group of officials to advise him throughout this crisis, known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EX-COMM). EX-COMM did not believe that there were nuclear warheads in Cuba, just the missiles(The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962/Chronology). They may have worked differently that first day if they had known that there were in fact warheads on the island and they were ready to use them. Kennedy faced the challenge of not relenting to the Soviets while taking a stand and at the same time avoiding military action. EX-COMM expected Khrushchev to retaliate no matter what action they took (Larson). The Cubans, the Soviets, nor the American public knew that the US was aware of the missile presence in Cuba. If any of these groups found out, panic would certainly ensue. On October 17th, another recon flight discovered more missiles, which had a range to hit almost any part of the continental US(The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962/Chronology).
President Kennedy met with the Soviet Foreign Minister on October 18th, but did not mention the weapons in Cuba. However, he did remark about a statement he had made in September saying that “the US would not tolerate offensive weapons in Cuba” (Larson). By this time there were two paths the US was considering. Kennedy favored a blockade around Cuba, but some still wanted to air strike the island. Kennedy ordered that two speeches be written for October 22nd, the day when the American public would be told of these events (Hatch). Kennedy had wrapped this issue in secrecy, going about his days in public as if nothing was wrong, but behind closed doors he was all business. He had EX-COMM do a cost-benefit analysis of both their options(The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962/Chronology).
On Saturday, October 20th, the plans had been developed for both strategies. Kennedy was still on a campaign trip that he did not want to abort it, but had no choice. He told the public he had an upper respiratory infection and headed back to Washington where he met with EX-COMM. An air strike could not guarantee total success, and would cost thousands of lives, while a blockade would leave more options open(. Thus came October 22, the day when everything came into the open and things escalated even more. As Kennedy was preparing to give his speech to his public, army action was prevalent. The US would be ready for any of the reactions this speech could get. There were about 300 Navy ships headed to Cuba, there were missiles ready to be launched at Cuba, and there were 20 planes with nuclear weapons prepared to strike at the Soviet Union (Larson.) Kennedy gave his speech promptly at 7 P.M., and the world came to a halt for 17 minutes. “…it shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba…as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response on the Soviet Union,” Kennedy warned. In response to Kennedy’s speech, Khrushchev wrote, “I hope the United States government will display wisdom and renounce the actions pursued by you, which may lead to catastrophic consequences for world peace.” Khrushchev was especially taken aback by the blockade, which Kennedy had referred to as a “quarantine” so it would not be seen as an act of war. This was now a highly volatile situation.
The next day the Organization of American States approved of the Cuba quarantine. By the end of the day, US ships had positioned themselves along a quarantine line 800 miles from Cuba, with authorization to use force against any ship that did not stop (Larson). Robert Kennedy met with the Soviet Ambassador on this day, and was not happy with the way things went. He told the ambassador he did not know how things were going to turn out in the end. Soviet ships began to challenge the blockade on the 24th, but US ships did not have to use force and the Soviet ships turned around.
Khrushchev was not yet ready to take this crisis to the next level. However, Khrushchev wrote to Kennedy and told him that he would not stand by and let the Americans do whatever they want without facing consequences. “We will be forced on our part to take the measures we consider necessary…” Khrushchev stated.
Tensions continued to rise and rise, while diplomacy and bargaining continued. The United Nations tried to step in with a temporary resolution but Kennedy declined. Kennedy also wrote again to Khrushchev and said he will not back down (Larson). Meanwhile at the UN, a US ambassador confronted a Soviet ambassador about the missiles. When the Soviet denied their existence, the US ambassador showed the photographs, which was damning evidence (Hatch). Back in the United States, a journalist came up with a plan that would remove the Soviet missiles from Cuba, and remove the US missiles from Turkey. This seemed like a good position for both sides to take, and was under consideration by EX-COMM. By this time several missiles in Cuba were fully operational (Larson).
By October 26th it seemed like the only solution would be the missile trade plan or an invasion of Cuba (Hatch). Missiles were now being camouflaged in Cuba, and there was no halt in their development. On this Friday, Aleksandr Fomin, the KGB chief in Washington met with an ABC news correspondent and told him there could be a resolution in sight. He proposed that the Soviet bases would be removed from Cuba if the US promised not to invade Cuba. This was thought to be an official proposal because Fomin was a very high ranking official with Khrushchev. Later that day an even more important event occurred. Khrushchev corresponded with Kennedy, and it seemed he was ready to resolve the crisis. Things were finally looking up and diplomacy was finally paying off.
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