The mostly discouraging results of this study prompts an examination of the propositions underlying ISPs, and a reexamination of them in light of the California study’s findings. Petersilia and Turner (1990: 107), list four implicit propositions which underline the features of ISP programs:

• intensive monitoring will not only discover technical violations but also make it difficult for the offenders to commit new crimes
  
• if offenders know that their behavior is closely monitored and their probation can be revoked for technical violations, they will want to avoid violations
  
• technical violations are worth monitoring because they predict or signal that offenders are “going-bad”
  
• if a probation officer discovers violations and an offender’s probation is consequently revoked, or he or she is placed under more stringent ISP conditions, the system may be preventing crimes

The study’s results show the closer monitoring does not necessarily affect arrest rates. Actually, even though surveillance was 2-3 times more intensive for ISPs than for regular supervision, the arrest rates were virtually identical. However, one definite positive effect of ISP is that the closer monitoring brings more violations to light. Though offenders on regular probation had fewer violations, they may have mostly been because they were never caught due to the lower level of supervision (Petersilia and Turner, 1990: 106-107).

It is difficult for one to support or oppose ISP completely. The goals of ISP are laudable and will therefore be accepted by most. One may think the program is not currently as effective as it potentially could be and yet totally believe in its worth and usefulness. Recognizing the problems and impediments in ISP is important, because only then can ISP be changed into a program effective in all or most of its aims.

In an ideal world, all offenders would be placed on ISP, to better insure possible rehabilitation and to catch as many violations as possible. The resources do not currently exist to enact such a program, so the participants in ISP must be carefully chosen for their potential of success. These individuals are called the target group. Many ISPs establish certain bases for exclusion, among them a violent current offense or a lengthy criminal record. This makes sense, as resources should not be wasted on those proven to be incorrigible or too dangerous to be in the community. The problem is that such individuals are eligible for and are often placed on regular probation. This leaves violent and dangerous offenders under much lighter supervision than nonviolent, less dangerous ones (Clear and Hardyman, 1998: 48-49). This is certainly an illogical and potentially dangerous way of running a program. One solution may be to keep violent, dangerous offenders off probation totally. But with the current state of prison overcrowding, this cannot be considered a viable option. The most sensible solution would be for ISP and regular probation to swap the type of probationer each currently serves. It is logical that if a violent and dangerous offender is going to be on probation at all, that he receive the more intensive supervision than the offender who poses the lower risk.

There is another important problem in giving ISP to lower risk offenders. Not only can it be wasteful, it can be harmful. Behavioral scientists have long thought that the addition of strains and controls to a human system can result in a negative reaction, one contrary to the direction of the controls. The misuse and over use of intensive methods may cause a negative, criminal reaction to otherwise compliant individuals, just as it would to a regular, law-abiding citizen (Clear and Hardyman, 1990: 55).

This practice of ISP participant selection is one of the major contributing factors to its current ineffectiveness, and it should be examined and reworked to allow the program to reach its full potential.

Another undeniable factor that has an impact on the effectiveness of ISP is the attitude of those who are actors in the criminal justice system, and the politics involved. For liberals, ISP is a strategy to divert offenders from incarceration, yet still allows them not to look “soft on crime”. To a conservative, ISP is an opportunity to “get tough” on crime and increase control over offenders, but without adding to the overall costs of corrections. ISP is one of many intermediate sanctions in a new wave of alternatives to incarceration, which include split sentencing, house arrest, boot camps, etc. (Byrne, 1990: 6-7). The extent of prison overcrowding necessitates some type of alternative sanctions, an area in which there are many interested parties. These parties include policy makers at federal, state, and local levels; program sponsors; evaluation sponsors; evaluators from private organizations; program management and staff; program competitors; contextual stakeholders; and the offenders themselves (Byrne, 1990: 9).

Do so many interested parties sometimes impede the effectiveness of ISP? With the amount of conflicting stakes and interests, it would be certainly make sense. It is a safe assertion that political considerations and vested interests in outcomes have affected the number and quality of evaluations that have been conducted (Byrne, 1990: 9).

ISPs and other community corrections programs continue to grow and expand, despite the discovered problems and lackluster results of some studies. The need to limit government spending is one of the major reasons for the existence of alternative programs such as ISP. If prison crowding were to end tomorrow, the incentive to create alternative programs would almost certainly disappear also; the main concern of the most important supporters of ISP and other alternatives is government spending (Byrne, 1990: 7-9).

It has been suggested that there are latent functions to ISPs, and the expansion of these programs are linked to the realization of these unstated goals. These latent functions are:

1) bureaucratic and organizational goals,

2) administrators’ normative goals, and

3) professional and psychological goals.

Despite the apparent failure of ISPs to achieve their major stated goals, they do serve bureaucratic and organizational goals by enabling probation administrators to be “tough on crime” and increase the credibility of probation. ISPs serve administrators’ normative goals by being more punitive than traditional probation, therefore allowing the administrators to express a reduced tolerance of crime that they share with both the public and politicians. Lastly, ISPs serve professional and psychological goals. By attracting new resources and new visibility, ISPs put probation on the front lines of crime control, thereby enhancing the esteem accorded to probation and the self-esteem of overworked probation officers (Byrne, 1990: 9-10).

It has also been found that when the public is made aware of the range of punishments that exist, they support alternatives to incarceration, such as community corrections programs for offenders considered nonviolent and low-risk (Bayens, Manske, and Smykla, 1998: 192). It makes sense that the general public would not want dangerous offenders in the community, but this also brings back the notion that intensive methods are wasted on low-risk offenders, especially when high-risk offenders are actually receiving less intensive monitoring. Public defenders and state attorneys also seem to think ISP is a worthwhile program. When surveyed, a large majority recommended the extended use and range of ISP (Bayens, Manske, and Smykla, 1998: 194)

As with any other alternatives to incarceration programs themselves or anything else in the world for that matter, ISP is not perfect. As shown in this paper, it has many problems that impede its potential for great success. The need for and support of Intensive Supervision Probation certainly exists, but it will never reach its peak without a reworking of the manner in which both it and traditional probation's are run. Currently, ISP’s effective is stifled by problems, but it is a program which is highly deserving of attention and work needed for it to reach full fruition.

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Bibliography

Bayens, Gerald J., Michael W. Manske and John Ortiz Smykla. (1998) “The Importance of Research on Attitudes of Criminal Justice Workgroups Towards ISP.” American Journal of Criminal Justice, 22 (2): 192-205

Byrne, James M. (1990) “The Future of Intensive Probation Supervision and the New Intermediate Sanctions.” Crime and Delinquency, 36 (1): 6-34

Clear, Todd R. and Patricia L. Hardyman. (1990) “The New Intensive Supervision Movement.” Crime and Delinquency, 36 (1): 42-59

Geerken, Michael R. (1993) “Probation and Parole: Public Risk and the Future of Incarceration Alternatives.” Criminology, 31 (4): 550-561

Petersilia, John and Susan Turner. (1990) “Comparing Intensive and Regular Supervision for High-Risk Probationers: Early Results from an Experiment in California.” Crime & Delinquency, 36 (1): 87-110